The Stalemate From the Defense’s Side: Which Runner Should You Let Go?

If you have played or coached Baseball5 at any decent level, you know the moment. The hitter is safe at first, there is a runner on third, and the play is still live. Both runners take a few steps off their bases. The defense has the ball, and everybody is waiting to see who blinks first.

This is what Tony Jones named the stalemate situation. In my book Round It! I spent a whole chapter on it from the offense’s point of view. But the more I looked at the numbers, the more I wanted to turn the question around:

If you are the defense, and you realistically can’t stop both runners, which one should you let go?

I want to be upfront: this exact question isn’t answered directly in any of my books. But when I put the numbers from the books next to each other, I think the answer is surprisingly clear. And like so many things in Baseball5, it’s not the answer most of us would reach if we just “think baseball”.

The two choices the defense really has

In practice, the defense usually ends up making one of two choices:

  1. Protect home. You keep the ball near the runner on third, so they stay put. The hitter-runner uses the moment to walk into second base. The next play starts with runners on second and third.
  2. Protect the forced base. You chase the hitter-runner back to first base and accept that the runner from third scores. The next play starts with a runner on first only, one run already on the board.

Choice 1 feels like good defense. You didn’t give up a run. But let’s look at what each choice actually leaves you with.

What the numbers say with 0 or 1 out

In Round It! I built a Run Expectancy Matrix from close to 12,000 at bats of European Baseball5 (the 2023 European Championship, the 2024 Youth European Championship and the France and Lithuania games of the 2024 World Cup). Run Expectancy is the number of runs a team can expect from a given situation until the end of the inning.

Here is what the two choices are worth, measured as the runs the offense can expect for the rest of the inning, including the run that already scored:

OutsProtect home (runners on 2B & 3B)Protect the forced base (1 run + runner on 1B)Difference
0 outs3.258 runs1 + 1.768 = 2.768 runsProtect the forced base gives up 0.49 fewer runs
1 out2.631 runs1 + 0.960 = 1.960 runsProtect the forced base gives up 0.67 fewer runs

So with zero or one out, the defense that “saved” the run is actually expected to give up about half a run more over the rest of the inning.

How can that be? Three things from my data come together here:

  • The runner on third is very likely to score anyway. With zero or one out, a runner on third scored on the next play close to 80% of the time in my data (0.785 with zero outs and 0.773 with one out). Holding them at third doesn’t remove the run. Mostly it just postpones it by one hitter.
  • Second base costs you a forced base. With runners on second and third, you only have a force play at first. With a runner on first, you have force plays at first and second.
  • Forced bases make hitting harder. In my dataset, hitters facing a runner on first hit .426 with zero outs and .396 with one out. Hitters facing runners on second and third hit .523 and .561. That is a massive difference for the very next at bat.

In plain English: when you protect home with less than two outs, you are trading a run that was probably coming anyway for a much easier at bat for the next hitter, and you still have a runner on third.

Why it flips with two outs

Now the same situation with two outs:

OutsProtect home (runners on 2B & 3B)Protect the forced base (1 run + runner on 1B)Difference
2 outs1.138 runs1 + 0.413 = 1.413 runsProtect home gives up 0.28 fewer runs

With two outs, the picture turns around. Now you should protect home, even if it means the hitter-runner reaches second.

The reason is simple. With two outs, the runner on third only scored on the next play about half the time in my data (0.478). The next out ends the inning, and the run never happens. A ground out at first base is enough. On top of that, there is always a chance that the next hitter makes a hitting error. So the run you prevent now has a real chance of never being scored at all. That is a very different trade than with zero or one out.

What about trying to throw the runner out at home?

This is where I want to be careful not to oversimplify. Everything above is about the choice of focus when you can’t stop both runners. A real, clean play at home on a runner who has committed is a different thing. If you get that out, you erase a run and add an out, and that is a huge swing. If you have the play, take it.

What the numbers warn against is the half-way version: freezing the runner on third with a ball fake, getting stuck between two decisions, and ending up with the run scoring and the runner reaching second. That outcome gives up the run and still leaves the next hitter with an easier at bat.

The principle

If I had to put this on a whiteboard for my team, it would look like this:

  • 0 or 1 out: Keep the hitter-runner on first. Let the runner on third go, unless you have a clean play on them at home.
  • 2 outs: Protect home. If the hitter-runner takes second, so be it. The next out ends the inning.

It is interesting that the offensive side of the data tells the same story from the other direction. In Round It! I calculated that the offense gains run probability by engaging in the stalemate with zero or one out (+13% and +15.5%), but slightly loses by engaging with two outs (−5%). The defense and the offense are looking at the same numbers. The team that knows them best usually wins the stalemate.

A disclaimer

These numbers are averages across many teams and tournaments, not truths about your team. If your opponent has a hitter who almost never fails with runners on second and third, or your team has a great arm for the play at home, the trade changes. Use the principle as a baseline, and then adjust it to the players in front of you.

I think the bigger lesson is this: in baseball, “never give up a free run” is a sound instinct. In Baseball5, where a runner on third is already close to a run and forced bases matter this much, the same instinct can cost you runs. That’s exactly why I keep saying we have to stop assuming and start checking.

Sources

  • Spielmann, P. (2026). Round It! – Data-Driven Baseball5 Baserunning. Chapter 2 (probability of the runner on third scoring), Chapter 4 (the stalemate and the AVG per situation) and Chapter 7 (Run Expectancy Matrix). Data from roughly 12,000 at bats across the 2023 European Championship, the 2024 Youth European Championship and the 2024 World Cup.
  • Spielmann, P. (2025). A Runner on 2B Is Not in Scoring Position… …and Why You Should Care. Chapter 3 (“Runners on third base are golden”).
  • Spielmann, P. (2026). Who’s Up? – The Art of Creating an Effective Lineup in Baseball5. Chapter 3 (how forced bases change the difficulty of recording a hit).

Want to go deeper?

The stalemate is one of my favorite situations in the game, because both teams are doing math whether they know it or not. If you want to dig into the data behind it, start with Round It! – Data-Driven Baseball5 Baserunning and A Runner on 2B Is Not in Scoring Position… …and Why You Should Care.

You can find all my books on my Buy my books page and on Amazon (.com / .de). They are also available as audiobooks on Spotify. If you have Spotify Premium, audiobook listening time is included in the subscription in many countries. The audiobooks don’t have the graphs and tables, but all the main ideas are there.

If you would rather talk it through, I offer one-on-one coaching sessions and a strategy discussion course for coaches and teams. Get in touch or write to me at Show email. I’m always happy to talk Baseball5.